Official Data Say China’s Economy Is Barely Slowing. Are They Believable?
Oct 19th 2015, The Economist
FOR most countries, delivering resilient growth when investors had expected an abrupt slowdown would be impressive. China is different. The announcement that its economy grew 6.9% in the third quarter, just below the second quarter’s 7% pace, is more grist for the already-brimming mill of scepticism about its data. Such are the doubts about Chinese figures that it is difficult to write a straightforward analysis of them without riddling it with caveats about what is and is not credible. So it is sensible to look at the latest numbers in two parts: what the government reported and what ought to be believed.
官方数据显示中国经济基本无下滑，这可信吗？
当投资者们预计经济会突然下滑时却出现弹性增长，是非常令人惊叹的，这种情况存在于许多国家中，但中国则不同。据报道，中国第三季度经济增长了6.9%，仅次于第二季度的7%，这些数据引起了一片质疑。在不确定什么可信的情况下，我们很难对它们进行直观的分析。因此，最明智的做法是从以下两个方面来看待这些数据：政府的实际报道和报道的可信程度。
The official data are indeed impressive, not least because they cover a quarter during which concerns about China's economy were so widespread. July began with the stockmarket in turmoil, falling some 40% from peak to trough. Flailing attempts by the government to prop up share prices tarnished its reputation for technocratic competence. A mini-devaluation of the yuan in August added to the feeling that China’s economy was in trouble. And a series of surveys pointed to contraction in the manufacturing sector.
官方数据的确令人印象深刻，主要是因为这些数据显示了中国一个季度的经济情况，从各个方面表明了中国经济情况很令人担忧。例如：七月初股市动荡，股价下跌了40%；政府整治无力，其反复无常的措施并未使股价回升；八月人民币的小幅贬值加剧了中国经济的困境；且一系列调查显示制造业也面临缩减。
Against that bleak backdrop, growth of 6.9% is a remarkably good performance. It might be China’s slowest quarter since early 2009, the nadir after the global financial crisis, but the economy is twice as big now as it was then. A gradual, steady rebalancing of the growth model helps explain the solid figures. As commodity exporters can readily attest, China’s factories are struggling. The industrial sector expanded 5.8% year on year in the third quarter, just about the weakest in more than two decades. But China is changing. The services sector expanded 8.6% year on year in the third quarter, matching its strongest growth since 2011. That is important because, as of a few years ago, services account for a bigger share of the economy than industry does.
在这样惨淡的经济背景下，6.9%的经济增长率着实是一个好的表现。这个季度的经济增长率也许是2009年全球金融危机以来增长最缓慢的季度，但仍是以前的两倍，这得益于稳中求进的经济增长模式。商品出口业的发展证明了中国工厂仍在苦苦挣扎。第三季度的工业生产总额年同比扩大了5.8%，但仍是过去二十多年增长率最低的季度。但这一情况正在发生转变：第三季度服务业扩大了8.6%，是自2011年以来增幅最大的一次，这一点非常重要，因为近年来服务业在经济中所占的比重远大于工业。
The transition can also be seen in the seemingly relentless slowdown of investment versus much more robust consumption. Overall investment rose 10.3% year on year in the first nine months of 2015, the lowest in 15 years. But retail sales nudged up to 10.8% growth year on year in real terms in September, a seven-month high. A healthy labour market has supported this rebalancing. Income growth actually improved a touch in the third quarter, accelerating to a 7.7% year-on-year increase in real terms.
在持续减少的投资和稳健增长的消费中，这种转变也是显而易见的。例如：2015年前九个月的总投资同年比虽然增加了10.3%，为15年来最低；但9月份的零售销售年同比实际增长了10.8，为七个月来最高。健全的劳动力市场促进了各方面的再平衡。第三季度个人收入年同比实际增长了7.7%，得到了实质性的提高。
Just how believable are these numbers? Analysts who question the data can generally be sorted into two camps: those who think that China’s numbers are out-and-out fabrications, concealing the economy’s true, grim state; and those who think that China’s numbers are embellishments, inflating growth but not altogether misrepresenting it. The weight of evidence is on the side of the latter.
以上数据有多少可信度呢？质疑这些数据的经济分析家大体可分为两类：一部分认为这些数据完全是捏造的，隐瞒了其经济发展中真实、严峻的情况；另一部分认为这些数据是稍加润色的，但并未扭曲事实。显然，第二种观点更具说服力。
The most extreme scepticism about Chinese data focuses on a range of indicators that have served in the past as decent barometers for the broader economy. Power output, for example, has risen just 0.1% so far this year, which would normally imply that real growth is far slower than the government's figure. Imports have also been very weak, falling nearly 18% year on year in September. But these indicators are windows onto the industrial sector, the very part of the economy that is suffering the steepest deceleration. Trying to get a full read on growth from import data is even more problematic: plunging commodity prices have depressed the value of Chinese imports. What is more, the shift towards more services-led growth shows up in current-account statistics, not monthly merchandise trade figures.
那些曾在宏观经济中处于重要地位的产业，其实际发展情况受到了人们强烈的质疑。例如，供电局的经济增长总额仅提升了0.1%，这意味着实际增长率远低于政府公布的数据。九月份的进口额也十分低，同年比下降了近18%。这些迹象表明了工业部门（经济的重要组成部分）正遭受这重创。想要从进口数据中全面解读经济增长是非常困难的，因为商品价格的下降削弱了进口商品的价值。此外，越来越多的以服务业为导向的经济增长的转变表明了经常项目数据并不等同于每月的商品贸易数据。
One partial solution is to look at the government’s nominal data alone, ignoring its deflator. Here, the picture that emerges is more closely aligned with the impression of a sustained slowdown in China. Nominal growth fell to 6.2% year on year in the third quarter, markedly lower than the second quarter 7.1% pace. It was the slowest since 1999 and less than a third of the jaw-dropping 20% nominal rate chalked up in 2011. What’s more, the collapse in commodity prices has flattered China’s growth rate. The resulting fall in imports has translated directly into a big rise in the trade surplus, boosting overall growth. Stripping out net exports, China’s nominal domestic-demand growth is probably closer to 5%, according to analysts with China International Capital Corp, a local investment bank. That is a sharper slowdown than the one portrayed by the government. But it is still a good deal better than the hard landing feared for China just a few months ago.
其中一个解决方案就是仅着眼于政府公布的所谓数据，而忽略它的紧缩指数，这样就更贴切于中国经济持续下降的现象。中国第三季度名义上的增长率下降到6.2%，明显低于第二季度的7.1%，创1999年以来最低，且令人吃惊的是此数据同样低于2011年总体下降率的1/3（20%）。而且，物价的暴跌促进了增长率。进口额的减少直接导致了贸易顺差的大幅增加，促进了经济全面发展。根据中国国际金融有限公司（一家当地的投资银行）分析，除去净出口，中国所谓的内需增长率也提高了5%，尽管这仍低于政府公布的数据，但却比几个月前人们预期的要好得多。
